Authors: | Karopoulos G., Fakis A., Kambourakis G. |
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Title: | Complete SIP message obfuscation: PrivaSIP over Tor |
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Conference: | The 9th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) - 9th International Workshop on Frontiers in Availability, Reliability and Security (FARES) |
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Editors: | A. M. Tjoa, E. Weippl et al. |
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Ed: | No |
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Eds: | Yes |
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Pages: | 217-226 |
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To appear: | No |
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Month: | September |
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Year: | 2014 |
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Place: | Fribourg, Switzerland |
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Pubisher: | IEEE CPS |
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Link: | http://www.ares-conference.eu/conference/ |
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File name: | siptor.pdf##^^&&314865552.pdf |
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Abstract: | Anonymity on SIP signaling can be achieved either by the construction of a lower level tunnel (via
the use of SSL or IPSec protocols) or by employing a custom-tailored solution. Unfortunately, the
former category of solutions present significant impediments including the requirement for a PKI and
the hop-by-hop fashioned protection, while the latter only concentrate on the application layer, thus
neglecting sensitive information leaking from lower
layers.
To remediate this problem, in the context of this
paper, we employ the well-known Tor anonymity
system to achieve complete SIP traffic obfuscation
from an attacker’s standpoint. Specifically, we capitalize on Tor for preserving anonymity on network links that are considered mostly untrusted,
i.e., those among SIP proxies and the one between
the last proxy in the chain and the callee. We also,
combine this Tor-powered solution with PrivaSIP
to achieve an even greater level of protection. By
employing PrivaSIP we assure that: (a) the first
hop in the path (i.e., between the caller and the
outbound proxy) affords anonymity, (b) the callee
does not know the real identity of the caller, and (c)
no real identities of both the caller and the callee
are stored in log files. We also evaluate this scheme
in terms of performance and show that even in the
worst case, the latency introduced is not so high as it might be expected due to the use of Tor. |